Adding Nudge-based Reminders to Financial Incentives for Promoting Antibody Testing and Vaccination to Prevent the Spread of Rubella
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Just Accepted [本文リンク]
共同研究者
- 佐々木周作(大阪大学)
- 大竹文雄(大阪大学)
要約
We study effects of combining financial incentives with nudges to promote rubella antibody testing and vaccination. In FY2019, the Japanese government began providing vouchers for free testing and vaccination to men aged 40–57 years. Vouchers were mailed to 40–46-year-old men in FY2019. While those aged 47–57 received vouchers in FY2020, they could obtain vouchers and receive testing and vaccination in FY2019 through applying. Focusing on this policy distinction, we conduct a late-FY2019 online field experiment with Japanese 40–57-year-old men. We randomly send nudge-based reminder messages recommending antibody testing and vaccination, and track self-reported behavior until the end of FY2019. One nudge-based reminder with an altruistic message on fetal harm through infection from men to pregnant women significantly promotes antibody testing and vaccination among those who have already received vouchers as a financial incentive. For those who must apply for vouchers, nudge-based reminders have no promoting effect.
ディスカッションペーパー