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    <title>Monetary Donations on Hiroki Kato</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Monetary Donations on Hiroki Kato</description>
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      <title>Tax Incentive and Charitable Giving: A Case of South Korea</title>
      <link>https://katopachi.github.io/en/project/south-korea-tax-system/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Joint with Tsuyoshi Goto (Chiba University) and Yong-Rok Kim (Kobe University)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many countries use a decrease of giving price through tax benefit to promote charitable giving.
However, since a use of tax benefit leads to a decrease of governement&amp;rsquo;s revenue,
it also reduces public goods provided by governement.
Thus, a use of tax benefit depends on a benefit of charitable giving (increase private provision of public goods) and a cost of a decrease of public goods provided by governement.
Our project estimates the price elasticity of giving using the 2014 tax reform in South Korea, and investigates how those who think that the tax is the best way of donations respond to the giving price.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Patron-Dictator Game: Strategic Interaction between Charities and Donors</title>
      <link>https://katopachi.github.io/en/project/patron-dictator-game/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Aug 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://katopachi.github.io/en/project/patron-dictator-game/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Asymmetric information is a big issue in a charity market.
In the market, donors delegate production with third party interests to charities,
giving a part of wealth.
However, there is a case where donors cannot know how charities use their own money beforehand.
This project aims to clarify the effect of this asymmetric information with respect to productivity on
charity market, using a laboratory experiment called patron-dictator game.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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